

RECENT CASE SUMMARIES

In **Porto Vita, Ltd., et al., vs. Bellini, et al.**, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1875a (Fla. 3rd DCA August 8, 2007) Developer appealed from a judgment entered in favor of Owner after a jury trial. Developer was the owner/developer of the South Tower of Porto Vita, a residential condominium complex, in Aventura, Florida. Owner contracted with Developer to purchase a luxury penthouse unit from Developer. Both prior to and at the closing, Owner complained of problems with the unit's air conditioning system. These problems included leakage, dust accumulation, abnormal noise, and uneven air flow temperatures. An inspection revealed that the problems were caused by several deficiencies in the installation of the system, such as the use of concealed space as part of the duct system; locating the air handling unit in a closet; unprotected fibrous glass ductwork in the mechanical room; inadequate drain pans under the air-conditioning unit and the hot water heater; no return ductwork; failure to seal the mechanical rooms and plenums; substandard air filtration module; failure to install balancing dampers; and insufficient ventilation rate. Owner filed the lawsuit against Developer asserting three theories of liability; breach of statutory implied warranty of fitness and merchantability under Section 718.203, Florida Statute, breach of contract, and violation of the Florida Building Code. The case was ultimately tried before a jury on the warranty claim and the breach of contract claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Owner on the warranty claim in the amount of \$31,918. The jury further found in favor of Developer on the breach of contract claim. Developer's primary argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Owner because the alleged defects are outside the scope of Section 781.203, Florida Statutes, which sets forth Developer's statutorily implied warranties. In particular, Developer contended that the claim is barred by the language of subsection (1)(e) which excludes ". . . mechanical elements serving only one unit." The statute classifies the type of property involved, assigning to each a different warranty period. The classifications are: (a) the unit; (b) the personal property transferred with each unit; (c) all other improvements for the use of the unit owners; (d) all other personal property for the use of the unit owners; (e) the roof and structural components, and mechanical, electrical and plumbing elements serving a building (rather than a single unit; and (f) all other property conveyed with a unit. The appellate court noted that subsections (a), (b) and (f) are primarily concerned with the residential unit itself while (c), (d), and (e) pertain to the common elements of the condominium complex. Developer argued that subsection (e) should control because it specifically excludes ". . . mechanical elements serving only one unit." However, the appellate court noted that clear objective of the statute is to cover the complete unit and all common elements. Developer's warranties extend to personal property transferred with the unit. It would therefore be absurd to conclude that the legislature purposely intended to exclude from the warranties such an integral part of a luxury penthouse condominium as is a central air conditioning system. Based upon the foregoing, the appellate court affirmed the judgment entered in favor of Owner and against Developer.

In **Lakewood Village Condominium Association, Inc., vs. Beracha**, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 880a (Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida June 26, 2007), Owner and her husband owned a single condominium unit in Association. Both Owner and her husband timely filed notices of their intent to be a candidate for the board of directors. After receipt of both notices of intent to be candidates, the three members of the board of administration amended the bylaws to state that notwithstanding ". . . anything to the contrary herein, there shall only be one (1) director serving from any one (1) unit at any time. In the event that more than one (1) owner of a unit is elected to the Board at the same time, one of those owners, preferably the one who received the lower number of votes, if that is ascertainable, shall be deemed to have resigned, effective immediately. The Board shall then appoint to fill the remaining vacancy, as elsewhere provided herein." At the election, both Owner and her husband were elected to the board. Association filed the instant action for declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the amendment and to determine whether Owner could continue to serve on the board (Owner's husband was permitted to remain on the board because he received more votes). The court noted that in accordance with Section 718.112, Fla. Stat., all unit owners, except convicted felons who have not had their rights restored, are entitled to run for the board of directors. It follows then that a statutory eligibility to run for the board of directors of a condominium association implicates an eligibility to thereafter serve on that board once elected. The intent of the legislature would be thwarted by an interpretation that the legislature only wanted to open eligibility to candidacy, but not board membership. Therefore, the court found that the amendment to the bylaws was in conflict with the requirements of the Florida Statutes and was therefore invalid. The court found that Owner was validly elected to the board and could immediately assume her position.

WEAN & MALCHOW, P.A.

646 EAST COLONIAL DRIVE, ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32803

TEL: (407) 999-7780 FAX: (407) 999-LAW1 E-MAIL: W-M@WMLO.COM

WWW.WMLO.COM